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Abstract
Income transfers from social programs are often not gender neutral and should, according to the vast 
literature on intra-household decision making and allocation, affect the distribution of bargaining 
power within the household. This result, however, was by and large established under the assumption 
of marriage stability. If this assumption does not hold, then the positive response of bargaining power 
to income found in the empirical research may be the artefact of sample selection. One may postulate, 
however, that when restricted to certain groups in the population, such as seniors, the assumption 
may hold since their probability of divorce is close to zero. In this paper we prove that the assumption 
is wrong, even when applied to seniors. We use a non-contributory pension reform in Argentina, 
that resulted in an unexpected and substantial increase in permanent income for around 1.8 million 
women, to study its effects on outcomes related to both marital stability and women’s bargaining 
power within the household. We find that the reform increased the probability of divorce/separation 
among senior highly educated women but had no impact on the low-educated. Instead, the latter 
gained considerable bargaining power within the household by decreasing the probability of being the 
only one in charge of household chores in tandem with an increase in their husbands’ participation 
in these chores.
Keywords: intra-household bargaining power, marital disruption, divorce, non-contributory 
pensions, public transfers, household chores, collective models, permanent income shock
JEL Classification: J12, J16, J26, H55
1 In trod uction
Over the past two decades, several countries, mainly in Latin America, introduced social programs to 
fight poverty and inequality. Amongst the most expensive programs are non-contributory pensions 
aimed at extending pension coverage to individuals that did not fully contribute to the social security 
system (Levy and Schady 2013). These pension programs are often not gender neutral. For example 
in Latin America, women are particularly affected because of their low attachment to the formal 
labor market. Thus, these transfer programs do not only redistribute income between households 
but also alter permanently the distribution of income within households.
The non-contributory pension reform implemented in Argentina in 2007, known as the mora- 
torium, is an ideal setting in which to analyze the effects of exogenous, asymmetric (women were 
favored), and permanent income effects within the household. Upon the reform, the percentage of 
pension beneficiaries among elderly women went from 57% in 2005 to 92% in 2009, the highest in 
South America (Rofman et al. 2014, Benigni et al. 2012), and by 2010 more than 1.8 million women 
were direct beneficiaries (D’Elia et al. 2011). The reform resulted in a sizable spending of public 
money which amounted to 2.4% of GDP (Lustig and Pessino 2013).
The vast literature on decision making and allocation within the household predicts that income 
increases such as those that occurred in Argentina should have a positive effect on female bargaining 
power.1 Most of this literature, however, either assumes or is conditional on marriage stability.1 2 If 
this assumption does not hold and income shocks cause some couples to breakup, the positive esti- 
mated effects of income shocks on bargaining power (amongst those who remain married) revealed in 
the literature may simply be a consequence of sample selection. One may postulate that the marriage 
stability assumption is acceptable when applied to senior couples because of their stable lives and 
low probability of divorce.3 In this paper, we prove this is not the case; we find large and signifi-
1Some references are: Becker 1974, Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981, McElroy 1990, Thom as 1990, Schultz 1990, Lundberg and Pollak 1993, Bourguignon et al. 1993, Lundberg and Pollak 1996, Lundberg et al. 1997, Gray 1998, Browning and Chiappori 1998, Chiappori 1988, W ard-B atts 2008, A ttanasio and Lechene 2002, Brown 2009 and Browning et al. 2011 for a thoroughly survey. The first empirical papers in this literature aimed to test ‘income pooling’ in the household, a necessary condition of the unitary model. By rejecting th a t model, the link between income and bargaining power is, a t least indirectly, established.2Divorce or union dissolution are treated  as th reat points tha t are not observed in equilibrium. There are some exceptions such as Schultz 1990— where the possibility of divorce is taken into account empirically although the author conveys the need for more convincing exclusion restrictions— , and Gray 1998 who did not find effects of changes in divorce laws on divorce probabilities.3 Using m icrodata from the 2009 American Community Survey, which provide detailed information regarding changes
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cant effects of the Argentinean pension reform on the probability of divorce/separation among senior 
women. And considering only those women not affected by selection through divorce/separations, 
i.e. the less educated, we then look for effects of the reform (and of shocks to the female income share 
in general) on measures of bargaining power. The less educated is a large group, representing 60% of 
the sample of married/cohabiting women, and it is among them that we find the largest impact on 
income. In short, the main contribution of our paper is to analyze the effects of permanent income 
shocks on bargaining power together with the effects on selection through divorce/separation.
The estimated effect on divorce/separation concurs with the ’independence effect' hypothesis 
(Ross et al. 1975, also supported by Becker 1974), which predicted an increase in divorce/separation 
rates with the increase in married women’s incomes relative to their husbands’.4 Our empirical 
analysis on this topic is most related to Bobonis 2011, who estimates the effect of conditional cash 
transfers to women from the PROGRESA program in Mexico on union dissolution, although it 
differs in meaningful ways. First, we look at the effects of transfers on a sample of senior women. 
Second, we look at the effects of permanent unconditional transfers —as opposed to transitory and 
conditional transfers. Third, and most important, the total amount transferred exceeds by far the 
amounts transferred in the case of Bobonis 2011 and in other related papers. More specifically, the 
net present value received by an Argentinean woman who has made no social security contributions 
is around 38,135 USD 2009, which represents roughly 5 times the amount transferred by the Mexican 
program PROGRESA, 4 times the amount of the early 1990s South African pension reform, and 11 
times the amount transferred by the Mexican program “70 y mas”.5 Finally, presumably because 
the transferred amounts are so much larger, our results are strikingly different from previous papers:
to the family structure including divorce, we computed the average 12-month probability of divorce for women aged 60-65 to be around 0.7 percent. Unfortunately, there are no such surveys for Argentina, but from adm inistrative data  for the city of Buenos Aires (Institute of Statistics and the Census of Buenos Aires) we calculate a probability of divorce of approximately 0.73 percent for women aged 60-65.4The weight of the evidence in the economic literature favors the ‘independence effect’ hypothesis (e.g. Becker et al. 1977, Weiss and Willis 1997, Weiss 1997, Jalovaara 2003, Bobonis 2011, and Doiron and Mendolia 2011), although there are notable exceptions (Hoffman and Duncan 1995 and more recently Hankins and Hoekstra 2011).5The net present value figures were computed assuming a conservative 5.3% interest rate and all m onetary values were converted to USD 2009 (WDI 2009, World Bank, see footnote 15 for more details on this conversion). We assume a life-expectancy of 15 years i.e. life until 75 years old. The comparison number for the South African pension reform (described for example in Edmonds et al. 2005, Duflo, 2000) is 10,434 USD 2009 and is calculated under the exact same assumption about life-expectancy, although it is an overestimation since life-expectancy for the South African female population is lower. Under the Mexican program  “70 y más” described in Galiani et al. 2016, seniors s ta rt receiving transfers at the age of 70 years old. Hence, to be consistent we assume a life-expectancy of 5 years, which makes up a to tal of 3,336 USD 2009. Finally, for the case of the CCT program  PROGRESA (e.g. Bobonis 2011), we assume families may be receiving the benefit for a t most 7 years, totaling 7,575 USD 2009.
2
while the literature finds either no impact of transfers on the independence of older women (Edmonds 
et al. 2005), or a modest impact on marital dissolution of younger women (Bobonis 2011), we find a 
large impact on divorce/separation of older women.
Contrary to divorce/separation, bargaining power is not directly observable. To circumvent this 
shortcoming, the empirical literature has focused on variables arguably described as outcomes of 
intra-household bargaining (e.g. female and children’s consumption, children’s health and nutri- 
tion).6 We follow the same strategy but focus on outcomes related to household production i.e. 
household chores. Very little is known about the effect of income (or bargaining power more gener- 
ally) on the non-market labor in the form of household chores.7 Importantly, household production 
or chores may react to income very differently from other outcomes. The reason lies in the po- 
tentially different interaction between bargaining power, personal preferences for household chores 
and domestic goods, and household members’ relative productivities in housework and in the labor 
market (Gupta and Stratton 2010, Browning et al., 2011). It is, thus, a truly empirical issue to know 
how housework reacts to asymmetric income shocks. An extreme example is the evidence of the “do 
gender” hypothesis (e.g. Brines 1994, Bittman et al. 2003, and more recently Bertrand et al. 2015) 
whereby husbands’ (wives’) participation in housework decreases (increases) with the wives’ income 
share when husbands’ income is lower than that of their wives. Because the income share of the 
average wife in our sample is relatively low (between 26-30%) it is not surprising that we do not find 
evidence in support of the “do gender” hypothesis. Instead, we find that the Argentinean pension 
reform led to higher male participation in household chores.
But to what extent can we argue that this finding is a sign of female empowerment? One 
possibility is that higher male participation in household chores allows women to enjoy more leisure
6Recent papers by Majlesi 2014 and Ambler 2015 interpret direct answers regarding the identity of the decision makers in household surveys as more direct measures of bargaining power. There is at least one potential drawback regarding this interpretation for a t least some of the measures considered. For example, the wife may decide on what is for supper bu t how often does she take her husbands’ preferences into account instead of hers? W hen she cooks her husbands’ favorite dish more often than  her own then, although formally she is the decision maker, we argue tha t it is her husband who holds the real bargaining power. In these circumstances, outcomes may be closer to the real bargaining power than  the identity of the decision maker. Further criticisms of these measures are pointed out in A ttanasio and Lechene 2002.7Sociologists who studied the non-causal relationship between household work and earnings found in general a negative correlation between women’s earnings and household work (see for example B ittm an  et al. 2003 and the references there in). In the Economics literature Friedberg and Webb 2005 estim ate the relation between relative (hourly) wages (which they use as a proxy for bargaining power) and hours devoted to household chores. They present a number of specifications th a t minimize the endogeneity problems but suggest tha t future research should look for exogenous income sources. Our evaluation of the Argentinean pension reform would fill the void.
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and hence increase their well-being. Unfortunately, we neither observe leisure time nor the number of 
hours devoted to household chores. It is conceivable that an increase in male participation follows an 
even larger increase in female time devoted to household chores. The other possibility focuses on the 
relative contribution of husbands and wives to household production (e.g. Cooke 2006, Brown 2009, 
Kornrich et al. 2013).8 910We follow a similar approach and use indicators of shared housework. Hence, 
if after an asymmetric income shock we observe a more equal distribution of household chores, we 
interpret this as evidence of increased female bargaining power.9,10
Our paper is also directly related to important empirical literature on the consequences of public 
transfers. This literature has focused mainly on the labor supply response of the recipients and other 
household members, on children’s nutritional and educational outcomes, and on consumption (e.g. 
Duflo 2000, Attanasio and Lechene 2002, Bertrand et al. 2003, Edmonds 2006, Posel et al. 2006, 
Sienaert 2008, Ardington et al. 2009, Ponczek 2011, de Carvalho Filho 2012, Bosch and Guajardo 
2012, Juarez and Pfutze 2012, Danzer 2013, Galiani et al. 2016). Instead, we focus on a different 
set of outcomes directly related to the well-being of female recipients, such as marital stability and 
cooperation in household chores.
Using the Argentinean Continuous Permanent Household Survey (or EPH from the Spanish 
acronym for Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua) for 2004-2009, we estimate the effects of 
the reform by differences-in-differences (DD here after). As such, the reform increased the probability 
of receiving a pension by 53 percentage-points (pp), which translated into a 36 pp decrease in the 
probability of having no income and an average increase in monthly income of 62 USD adjusted for 
2009 purchasing power parity.
Likely through its effect on income, the reform brought about an increase in the probability of 
divorce or separation as well as an increase in the outcomes related to the wife’s bargaining power. 
Concretely, the probability of divorce/separation increased significantly by 2.6 pp, i.e., an increase
8Szinovacz 2000, for example, reports an increase in tim e devoted to household chores upon retirement.9This result would also be consistent w ith Lundberg and Pollak (1993)’s “separate spheres” bargaining model, where divorce is not an option, and failure of negotiation between the couple would lead to a non-cooperative equilibrium with an under-provision of the public good tha t each member of the couple provides according to gender specialization (e.g. the supply of household services in the case of women).10B ittm an  et al. 2003, for example, find th a t an increase in the share of women’s income in the household is not related to an increase in husbands’ participation in housework. In their paper, however, although they have a large set of controls, observed income shares are taken as exogenous variables, while in our case, we have an exogenous income change.
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of roughly 18%. This estimate, however, is somewhat misleading as the reform affected women 
of different education levels very differently. We find that while there is a 5.6 pp increase in the 
probability of divorce/separation amongst those with at least a high-school diploma, there is no 
effect on the less educated. Finding an effect of the reform on divorce/separations raises concerns 
over the validity of the bargaining power regressions on the sample of married/cohabiting women 
due to sample selection. To avoid contamination from sample selection, we analyse bargaining power 
effects on the sample of married/cohabiting women who are low-educated. This group of women is 
of considerable interest for policy-making since it comprises those with no or little attachment to 
the formal labor market who were therefore the most affected by the reform. In this sample, we 
find a statistically significant decrease of 7 pp (or 11.7%) in the probability that wives are the only 
ones in charge of household chores, and a statistically significant increase of 6.1 pp (or 16.5%) in the 
probability that husbands do some household chores. More broadly, we can estimate the effect of an 
increase in the wife’s income share on their bargaining power by using the reform as an instrumental 
variable for the female income share. Results from this approach, imply that a 10 pp increase in 
the wife’s income share within the couple leads to a 4.7 pp (or roughly 8%) decrease in the wife’s 
sole participation in household chores and an increase in the husband’s participation in household 
chores of 4 pp (or roughly 10%). We believe such large effects on divorce/separations and bargaining 
power were possible because transfers were sizable and permanent. Importantly, we confirm that our 
results are not driven by age differences between the control and the treatment group, by running 
robustness checks using placebo treatments and different control groups.
We conclude that as a consequence of the increase in income brought about by the Argentinean 
pension reform, highly-educated women were more likely to opt out of their marriages by increasing 
their probability of divorce/separation while the low-educated women opt in and gain more bargaining 
power within their marriages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the pension reform in Argentina. 
Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the 
main results. Section 6 shows the results of placebo treatments and other robustness checks and 
Section 7 concludes.
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2 T he P en sion  R eform
In Argentina, women can retire at 60 and men at 65 years of age. Besides reaching the retirement 
age, a worker must have 30 years of social security (hereafter SS) contributions to be entitled to 
collect a pension. These requisites, together with a traditionally low female participation in the 
labor market (around 44% in the 80s, ILO 2011) and an increasingly high level of informal jobs11, 
resulted in low pension coverage amongst women; by 2004 only 55% of age-eligible women received 
a pension, and only 35% when excluding widows (see Figure 2). Pension coverage was higher for 
males (75%) because of their greater participation in the labor force.
In December 2004, the Argentinean Government approved a reform to the pension system (Law 
25994), that extended pension and health insurance benefits to people of retirement age, i.e., cohorts 
1944 and older if female and cohorts 1939 and older if male, but who did not fulfill the 30-year SS 
contribution requirement. The reform was implemented through a payment schedule, which was 
officially named moratorium and popularly known as the housewives pension because housewives 
were perceived as the group of the population that benefited the most. The payment schedule 
consisted of paying back to the SS system the amount corresponding to the number of years (up 
to 30) the individual had failed to contribute subject to a cap. The debt to the SS would be paid 
in up to 60 monthly installments and was deducted directly from the individual’s monthly pension 
benefit. The law established a maximum deduction of 49% (Lustig and Pessino 2013), which implied 
that only a fraction of the debt would be paid. Housewives, for example, who had never contributed 
to SS would receive a pension equivalent to 51% of the minimum pension during the first 5 years, 
i.e. 304 ARS in 2007 or 191 U.S. dollars PPP 2009 per month, and 596 ARS or 374 U.S. dollars 
PPP 2009 per month afterward. This minimum transfer was just enough to cover the basket of 
basic needs for an adult in Argentina in January 2007, which cost 295.89 ARS (Source: INDEC). 
Assuming a 15-year life expectancy and a conservative 5.3% real interest rate (WDI 2009, World 
Bank), these figures imply that each woman who claims the full benefits from the moratorium costs 
the Argentinean State over 38,135 US PPP 2009 in net present value. Importantly, benefits were 
not automatic and those eligible had to apply in order to benefit from a pension.
Law 25994 expired in April 2007, but this had no effect on the 1944 or older cohorts because 1
11Tornarolli and Conconi 2007 report a 45% level of informality for all workers, bu t the value for women is likely to be higher (ILO 2011).
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of the prior approval of Decree 1454/05 in December 2005. Decree 1454/05 extended some of the 
moratorium benefits to younger cohorts as they reached 60 years old, although it established more 
stringent eligibility criteria.12 Hence, the pension reform affected different cohorts differently: older 
cohorts, born in 1944 or earlier, benefited relatively more than younger cohorts. In this paper, we 
concentrate on the effects of the first law that affected cohorts born in 1944 or earlier.
Law 25994 was unusual in that it was discussed and approved in the Senate and the Congress on 
the same day, December 16, 2004. This unusual trajectory and the lack of reference to the benefits in 
the preceding Bill (Bill 1183-D-03 of April 2003), are likely responsible for the scarce media coverage 
that the law received before December 2004. Despite the unusually fast approval process, the pension 
reform took more than 2 years to be fully implemented. This delay is documented in D’Elia et al. 
2011 and is consistent with the number of pension recipients and income effects observed in our data 
(see Figure 2). One reason for the late implementation was the delay in regulating the process of 
accessing pensions under the moratorium, which was completed in July 2006 (BOE 30870, March 
21, 2006 and Resolución General Conjunta AFIP 2091/2006, July 2006). Media coverage of the 
reform understandably peaked during this period. As we show in Figure A.1, news stories about the 
reform in the two major newspapers in Argentina, La Nación and El Clarin, appeared mainly in the 
last months of 2006. Concerns about strategic or biased news coverage are dismissed by the similar 
pattern shown over time in Google search counts (see Appendix Figure A.2).
3 D a ta
We use the Argentinean Continuous Permanent Household Survey (EPH) for the years 2004-2009.13 
The EPH is a rotating panel quarterly survey. Approximately 25, 000 households are surveyed every 
quarter. Households are in the panel for four quarters in two alternating periods of two quarters
12Decree 1454/05 only extends the m oratorium  to the self-employed among the younger cohorts. We could not find evidence as to whether this requirement was effectively m onitored or binding in practice. This aspect, however, is not of substance for our analysis.13We cannot consider the years before 2004 since there were im portant methodological changes to the EPH in 2003. Nor do we include data  after 2009 to ensure th a t women th a t would tu rn  60 are not included in the control group. Another im portant reason to leave years after 2009 out of the sample is the announcement and im plem entation of the Universal Child Allowance Program  (Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protección Social G arganta and Gasparini 2015) at the end of 2009. This program  paid a monthly am ount per child under 18 to parents working in the informal sector or unemployed (Resolution ANSES N° 393/2009). By 2011 almost 95% of the beneficiaries were women (ANSES, 2012). D ata for the third  quarter of 2007 is not available because some regions could not be surveyed because of adm inistrative problems in the Statistics Office.
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each, spanning one and a half years. Because of the short period that each household is in the survey, 
we do not explore its panel dimension. The survey covers 32 urban regions representing 62% of the 
country’s population but we must restrict our analysis to the 29 urban areas that were covered by 
the EPH before 2006.
The survey includes one household questionnaire and individual questionnaires for every person 
in the household. The questionnaires include questions about housing conditions, household and 
individual incomes, demographic characteristics, occupation and working conditions, certain types 
of social benefits, etc. Unfortunately, there is neither information on the number of years individuals 
have contributed to the SS system, which would have allowed us to identify individuals directly 
affected by the policy, nor can we identify individuals claiming benefits from the moratorium.
In our empirical analysis below we start by measuring the effect of the reform on different measures 
of personal income. Concretely, we consider the following income measures: the probability of 
receiving a pension,14 the probability of not having any personal income, the amount of monthly 
personal income, and for married/cohabiting women the wife’s share of income within the couple.15 
We transform Argentinean currency (Pesos ARS) to U.S. dollars (USD) using the purchasing power 
parity (PPP) conversion factor for private consumption in 2009.16
Our main outcome variables are: the probability of divorce or separation and measures of shar- 
ing housework. Regarding the former, we pool divorcees and separated individuals because the 
survey question does not allow us to distinguish between them. The measures of sharing housework 
are analysed for all married/cohabiting women or restricted to those who live only with their hus- 
band/partner, to better account for changes in bargaining power within the couple. The information 
used to construct the housework sharing variables comes from the household module of the survey. 
The respondent to the household module identifies which household members contribute to house­
hold duties, whether they do most of the housework or just help, as well as whether the household
14We constructed a dummy variable for “receives a pension” from the “income from pensions” category of the EPH. Only 2% of pension income was im puted by the Statistics Office.15Because monthly income is sometimes left unreported, the Statistics Office created a twin variable where missing values were imputed. In our sample only 9% percent of the observations had im puted monthly income.16The P P P  conversion factor is published by the International Comparison Program  database (World Bank). This factor represents the units of ARS required to buy the same am ount of goods and services in the domestic market as 1 USD would buy in the United States. We also use the U.S. annual inflation rate  to adjust for price changes in the United States throughout our period of analysis. Therefore, 1 U.S. dollar P P P  2009 has the same purchasing power as 1 USD in the United States in 2009.
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has domestic service or receives some external help.17 We constructed the following variables: i) 
A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the wife is the only person responsible for most of the 
household chores, i.e., no other household member is identified as in charge of most of the house­
hold chores; ii) a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the husband collaborates in housework, 
whether or not he is the only one responsible; and iii) a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
household has domestic service or external help with housework.
Other individual characteristics that we include as control variables in our regressions are: cohort 
dummies; region of residence (dummies for the 29 urban areas, Aglomerado in Spanish, where the 
EPH is conducted); educational level with high and low levels of education dummies, where a low 
level of education indicates less than a high school diploma; a dummy variable to identify those 
who were born abroad because most of those women are not able to benefit from the moratorium; 
and on the personal income regressions we additionally include a dummy that identifies those that 
belong to the richest one percent of the female sample to capture outliers in the income variable. 
In the regressions on the sample of married/cohabiting women we also control for variables that 
reflect age and educational differences between spouses that takes a positive value when the wife is 
more educated18 and a dummy that takes value one when the husband is more than 65 years old to 
account for changes in a husband’s behavior as a result of retirement.
Our sample includes women born between 1941-1944 and 1950-1953 (see Section 4 for the details 
about the sample selection) who are either married/cohabiting or divorced/separated and we use 
the EPH as a collection of repeated cross sections.19 The final database contains 34,036 individual 
observations of women aged between 51 and 68 years old. In the pre-reform period, 17% of these 
women were divorced or separated, and the rest were married or cohabiting (see column 5 in the first 
panel of Table 2). Panels B and C in Table 2 show summary statistics by educational group.
17Specifically, we use the closed-form answers to the following questions on the household questionnaire: 1) “Who does most of the housework?” Respondents can indicate up to two household members, domestic service or other help from people who do not live in the household; 2) “Which other people help in the household chores?” where respondents indicate which other household members help with these chores, or whether they receive external help or have domestic service.18The maxim um level of education attained is a categorical variable available in the EPH. We assign values between 0 and 6 to each category. The maximum education category is “Higher Education (complete)” with the value 6, and the minimum is “no formal education” w ith the value 0. The other categories are “elementary school (incom­plete)” , “elementary school (complete)” , “high school (incomplete)” , “high school (complete)” and “higher education (incomplete)” .19For the sake of brevity we do not report results for samples including all women but results hold and are available upon request.
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In the subsample of married/cohabiting women living only with their partner analysed in Section 
5, their personal income represented on average only 21% of the couple’s total income in the pre- 
reform period, 60% of them were uniquely responsible for doing the household chores, and 37% of the 
husbands collaborated in housework. Only 1% of this sample had domestic service or external help. 
In this sample of married/cohabiting women, the average personal income of the treated cohort 
before treatment was only 98.33 USD PPP 2009. This amount is much lower than the average 
personal income of a treated divorced woman before treatment (not shown in Table 3), this was 361 
USD PPP 2009, which in turn almost matches the long-run pension provided by the moratorium to 
a woman who had never contributed to the SS.
4 E m pirical strategy: D ifference-in -D ifference E stim ation
Although the Argentinean pension reform law was passed in 2004 and 2005, its full implementation 
started only in 2007, as noted in Section 2. Since our data set covers the period 2004-2009 we can 
compare outcomes of treated individuals before and after the law came into effect as part of our 
identification strategy. Accordingly, we define 2004-2006 as the pre-treatment period and 2007-2009 
as the post-treatment period.
To complete our identification strategy, we identify as our treatment group those cohorts affected 
by Law 25994, i.e. those born in 1944 or earlier. To avoid selection due to mortality and to keep the 
age difference between the treated and the control groups relatively small, we restrict the treated 
group to women born between 1941 and 1944.20 Notice that all these women had already turned 
60 by 2004 (their ages ranging between 60 and 65 in the pre-treatment period and between 63 and 
68 in the post-treatment period), which allows us to isolate the effect of the reform from the effect 
of changes in individual labor market decisions that occur at retirement age. Note that since we 
neither observe the number of years individuals contributed to the SS system nor who actually claims 
benefits resulting from the moratorium, our DD estimates identify intention-to-treat (ITT) effects. 
Our control group is composed of women born between 1950 and 1953, who, by definition, were not 
affected by the reform (neither by Law 25994 nor by Decree 1454/05) during our sample period.
20We could have included older cohorts, i.e., born before 1941, in the analysis as well but we were concerned tha t compositional effects due to m ortality would become a problem and the age difference in relation to the control group would render it invalid. This issue is further discussed in Section 5.2.
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Their ages range between 51 and 56 in the pre-treatment period and between 54 and 59 in the post- 
treatment period. Table 1 summarizes the cohort and age composition of the treatment and control 
groups. Using administrative records, Figure 4.4. from D’Elia et al. 2011 shows that by May 2010 
there were roughly 506,000 women from our treated cohorts affected by the moratorium.
Figures 3 and 4 show that after the reform the percentage of women in the treatment group that 
receives a pension increased from approximately 30% to more than 75% (widows excluded) and that, 
as a result, the percentage of women without any personal income fell from roughly 40% to 12%. 
Importantly, Figures 3 and 4 also show that: 1) the increase in pension coverage and personal income 
of women in the treated cohorts were only effective in 2007; 2) women from the control group were 
unaffected by the reform.
Table 2 shows the pre- and post-treatment means of a set of relevant variables for the treated 
and control groups. Differences between the treated and control groups are mostly due to their 
age difference. For example, because the younger cohorts are typically better educated, there are 
noticeable differences in education. Placebo runs and robustness checks based on a sample with a 
different cohort composition in Section 6 prove that this age difference by itself cannot explain the 
estimated effects of the reform that we obtain in Section 5.
The DD strategy relies on the assumption that the evolution of the outcome of the treatment 
group in the absence of the reform would have been the same as that of the control group. We 
check the plausibility of this assumption by comparing the evolution of the unconditional outcomes 
of interest for the treated and control groups during the pre-treatment period (Figures 6, 8 and 9). 
The evolution of all our outcomes across treatment and control groups before the reform took place 
in 2007 is similar.
Our model specification is:
Vit =  a  +  fíTreati x Postt +  + St + X 'y +  %,t (1)
where yit is the outcome of interest for individual i in time t, Treati is equal to one when woman 
i was born in the period 1941-1944, Postt equals to one when the outcome is observed in the post- 
treatment period 2007-2009, SC and St are cohort and period (year-quarter) fixed effects, respectively,
11
X i is a vector of individual characteristics and eit is the residual. The coefficient represents the 
DD estimate of the effect of the reform.
To allow for correlation between the error terms of different cohorts (treated and/or control) in 
the same geographical area, we cluster the standard errors at the urban area level. Clustering at 
the urban area level also deals with potential correlation originating from multiple observations (up 
to four) from the same individual. Because there are only 29 clusters, we show both the cluster 
robust sandwich standard errors estimates as well as the more conservative p-values based on wild 
bootstraps-t techniques for a 6-points weight distribution (Cameron et al. 2008, Webb 2013).21 23
We estimate equation 1 using the divorce/separated outcomes on a sample of divorced/separated 
and married/cohabiting women, as well as using the distribution of household chores outcomes on 
a sample of women living only with their partners. We restrict the sample of married/cohabiting 
women to those living only with their partners so that our outcomes on the distribution of household 
chores can better proxy for bargaining power within the couple.
An important concern in our setting is related to potential anticipation effects amongst women 
in the control group as they perceive themselves as future beneficiaries of the moratorium. Such 
anticipation effects, however, would bias downwards our difference-in-difference estimates, reinforcing 
our results.22,23
21W hen the number of clusters is not too small, it is common practice to cluster the standard  errors at the same level as treatm ent i.e. cohort level in our case (B ertrand et al. 2004, Donald and Lang 2007). Clustering at the cohort level, however, would lead to technical as well as specification problems. The technical problems are due to the very low num ber of treated  cohorts. In a recent paper, MacKinnon and Webb 2015 show th a t when the number of treated  cohorts is equal to or lower than  4—the number of treated  cohorts in our case is exactly 4— , the wild bootstrap-t m ethod (Cameron et al. 2008, Webb 2013), which is the most adequate to address the issue of low number of clusters, fails considerably. All our estim ates include cohort dummies which should account for some of the correlation th a t may exist among observations of the same cohort.22 Anticipation effects of the treated, for example due to the announcement of the law, also lead to an underestim ate of the effects of the reform. These anticipation effects are not very likely, however, given the scarce media coverage before mid-2006 (as shown in Section 2).23An alternative specification would be to exploit the panel structure of the EPH, considering the panel would allow us to include individual fixed effects and even include additional cohorts in the study. However, the approach has im portant drawbacks because it would reduce the sample size considerably (from 27,157 observations to just 7, 336) and more importantly, the treated  women’s exposure to the reform would be very short-lived, between 1 and 5 quarters. Moreover, there is a potential a ttrition  problem related to treatm ent in the sense tha t divorcees may be harder to follow up, creating an autom atically lower bias in the probability of divorce/separation estimates. We carried out this analysis and realized th a t the effects on income were considerably smaller in the shorter term. Perhaps due to the lower income effects, we did not find a short-run effect of the reform on outcomes related to the distribution of household chores. One possible explanation is th a t women may need to accumulate a minimum am ount of income before they can bargain with or separate from their partners; another possibility is th a t there was not enough tim e since the implementation of the reform for household members to internalize the change in their relative bargaining power.
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5 R esu lts
5.1 Effects o f th e  reform  on w om en’s incom e
In this subsection we show DD estimates of the effect of the reform on women’s probability of receiving 
a pension, on the probability of having no personal income, and on their monthly personal income 
using the specification of equation 1. All these DD effects are statistically significantly different from 
zero.
In Panel A of Table 4, we report results for the sample of divorced/separated and married/cohabiting 
women. The implementation of the pension reform successfully increased the percentage of women 
receiving a pension by 53 pp (313%), which meant a 36-pp reduction in the probability of having no 
personal income (69%). In column 3 we can see that the reform increased women’s monthly personal 
income by 61.5 USD PPP 2009. Note that since these are intention-to-treat effects, that is, not all 
women in the treatment group were effectively treated, the real income effect on the treated is much 
higher than values presented in this table.
In Panels B and C of Table 4 we break the effect on income by education. Groups with both a 
low and high level of education were affected by the reform, although the latter to a lesser extent. 
The probability of receiving a pension increased by 61 pp for women with a low level of education 
and by 38 pp for those with a high level.24 The results also indicate that the probability of not 
having any personal income was reduced by 41 pp for those with a low level of education and by 
25 pp for the highly educated. Despite the greater attachment to the formal labor market by the 
highly educated, which should grant them higher pensions conditional on claiming benefits under 
the reform, the results show that the average increase in the monthly personal income was greater 
for women with a low level of education (92 USD PPP 2009) than for highly educated women (48 
USD PPP 2009). All these effects confirm that highly educated women were less likely to enjoy the 
benefits from the reform.
24Research using other da ta  for Argentina raises concerns about under-reporting or lack of reporting of information on income (Cruces and Wodon 2003). The income im putation rate in our d a ta  varies by education (6% vs 14% for high levels of education). However, it is the estim ated effects for women with a lower level of education where im putation is lower which should be regarded as closer to the real treatm ent values, since this group is more likely to benefit directly from the reform because of the lower attachm ent to the formal labor market.
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5.2 Effects o f th e  reform  on th e probability o f d ivorce/separation
DD estimates reported in Table 5 show that the implementation of the reform had a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the probability of divorce or separation, increasing it in 2.6 pp. 
These effects are large if we take into account that the share of women in the treatment group that 
were divorced/separated before the reform was only 10% and that the probability of divorce at these 
ages is low (see footnote 3).25 However, this average effect is somewhat misleading as it affects 
women of different educational levels very differently. In columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 we see that the 
effect on the women with low levels of education is much smaller and not statistically different from 
zero while the effect on the highly educated is higher (5.6 pp) and statistically significantly different 
from zero.
We need to address potential compositional effects originating from a different evolution of the 
proportion of widows and singles in the treated and control groups as well as mortality. For example, 
women that were married/cohabiting in the pre-treatment but are widows in the post-treatment do 
not remain in the sample of divorced/separated and married/cohabiting women (“d+m”) in the post- 
treatment period. Hence, a higher probability of widowhood amongst the treated group automatically 
generates a larger increase in the rate of divorce/separation (d/(d+m)) for the treatment group 
because the number of married/cohabiting women in the denominator decreases.
Similarly, a higher probability of marriage among single women in the control group, because 
they are younger than the treated, would lead to an increase in the post-treatment denominator for 
this group and an upward bias in our estimated impact on divorce/separations. We follow three 
approaches to check that these compositional effects cannot explain our results: 1) we verify that 
including widows and single women in the sample does not qualitatively alter our results; 2) using 
the sample including widows and singles, we estimate equation 1 but using as an outcome variable 
an indicator for being a widow; 3) with the same sample as in 2), we also estimate equation 1 but 
using as an outcome variable an indicator for being single. The results of the last two exercises show 
that the estimated DD parameter is zero, which indicates that the results presented in Table 5 are
25We believe this effect is mainly driven by separations rather than  divorces because in Argentina getting a divorce is costly and alimony is not guaranteed. During the period of analysis, there is no unilateral divorce and couples need to be separated for a minimum of 2 years before they can file for divorce. Moreover, if a woman filing for divorce has no income source, it is up to the judge to decide how much and for how long her ex-husband should grant her alimony.
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not driven by differences in the evolution of widowhood or singlehood among treated and control 
groups (results not shown here for the sake of brevity, but available upon request). Mortality is an 
additional source of compositional effects. Mortality rates increase with age and, therefore, should 
be higher in the treatment group than in the control group. The restriction of treatment cohorts 
born after 1940 minimizes this possibility. In addition, mortality would only bias our results upwards 
if it was disproportionately higher amongst married/cohabiting women (versus divorced/separated 
women), which research shows is not the case (Manzoli et al. 2007).
5.3 Effects o f th e  reform  on th e bargaining power o f wom en
To analyse the effects of the reform on the bargaining power around the house we need to restrict 
the sample to married/cohabiting women. We further restrict the sample to women living only with 
their partners to better assess the distribution of bargaining power within the couple (results for 
the whole sample of married/cohabiting women are very similar and are shown in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix).26 Because of our results in the previous Section, we analyse only the women with a low 
level of education where there is no evidence of selection through divorce/separation.
We first show the effects of the reform on the income of married/cohabiting women who live 
with their partners only (columns 1-4 of Table 6), they are all very statistically significantly different 
from zero and of the same order of magnitude than those in Panel B of Table 4.27 Restricting to a 
sample of married people allow us to show the positive and large effect of the reform on the wife’s 
contribution to the couple’s income, which increased by 15 pp or 80%.
Columns 5-7 of Table 6 show the DD estimates of the effects of the reform on different outcomes 
related to the bargaining power of married/cohabiting women. The regressions include additional 
controls such as age and educational differences within couples and a dummy variable which takes 
the value 1 when the husband is above the legal retirement age for men. The differences in age and 
education in the couple are commonly used in the literature as distribution factors (Browning et al. 
2011) and proxy for women’s bargaining power previous to the reform. Their inclusion does not affect
26We checked th a t in the sample of m arried/cohabiting women, the reform did not affect the probability of living only w ith their partners. Results not shown for the sake of brevity.27In Section 6.3 we show th a t potential effects on labor market participation cannot account for the effects on bargaining power.
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the estimated effects substantially but does slightly reinforce some of our results by making them 
larger and more precisely estimated. Controlling for the retirement age for men is important not to 
confound gains in bargaining power that are a result of the reform with gains that are the result of 
a husband having more time available. In column 5 we show that the reform significantly reduced 
by 7 pp the probability that the wife is the only person responsible for household chores. However, 
this result would not reflect changes in bargaining power if it were entirely driven by a pure income 
effect associated with the reform that allowed women to substitute their own time for paid domestic 
services. This is not the case as we can see from results shown in column 7. On the contrary, we find 
that husbands or male partners significantly increase their participation in household chores by 6.1 
pp. Taken together, these results reflect that gender roles in the household become more alike with 
the reform.
6 P laceb o  and R ob u stn ess Checks
One concern with our methodology is that different age profiles in the treatment and control groups 
may blur the identification of the treatment effect. While effective in controlling for age differences 
within treatment and control groups, the cohort and period dummies included in all the estimations 
are ineffective in controlling for age differences across groups because age profiles do not overlap. 
Hence, to discard the possibility that the results obtained so far are driven by different outcome 
trends associated with the different age profiles across groups, we estimate a placebo treatment 
effect using data from pre-treatment years with the same age profiles as our main estimations in 
Section 5. The idea is to show that age differences across groups have zero impact on DD estimates. 
Placebo runs in Section 6.1. show that placebo treatment effects are not statistically different from 
zero, which suggests that different age profiles cannot explain our results.
The placebo methodology is not, however, without flaws. First, the lack of information about 
household chores on the pre-treatment data renders the placebo test incomplete. Secondly, the 
placebo treatment period may coincide with changes in other laws or overall labor market per­
formance which may impact differently the placebo treated and control groups. To address these 
concerns, in Section 6.2. we run a different robustness check that uses the same data period as our 
main specification but employs an alternative methodology. This alternative methodology has the
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additional advantage of identifying separately from the treatment effect an extra parameter reflecting 
the effects of aging and/or retirement. The empirical exercise shown in Section 5 was not able to 
effectively distinguish between treatment and aging/retirement effects since certain ages were ob- 
served only for a certain treatment status and period, e.g. all individuals above age 66 are observed 
only in the treated group in the post-reform period. In this circumstance, one may wonder if what 
the estimated effect of the reform is picking up includes the fatigue in marriage due to more intense 
cohabitation following retirement.
In Section 6.3 we discuss the potential effects on labor force participation.
6.1 P lacebo Runs
Using data from pre-treatment years, we estimate a placebo treatment effect. Specifically, as in 
our original framework, we include 6 years in our analysis (1996-2001), and define 1996-1998 as the 
placebo pre-treatment period, and 1999-2001 as the placebo post-treatment period.28 In the placebo 
treatment group, we include women born between 1933 and 1936, while in the placebo control group 
we have women born between 1942 and 1945. Therefore, the individuals in these placebo treatment 
and control groups are of the same age as individuals included in our original groups (see Tables 1 
and 7). If an age effect drives our results rather than an income effect, the results of this placebo 
DD should be similar to those presented in Table 5.
Table 8 presents the results of the placebo DD. First, in columns 1 to 3 we check that the evolution 
of incomes are similar for the placebo treatment and control groups in the pre- and post-treatment 
periods. Indeed, all coefficients are close to zero in magnitude and not statistically different from 
zero. The estimated effects on the probability of being divorced/separated (column 4) have the 
opposite sign to those in Table 5 and are not statistically significant.
The placebo exercise uses data from the EPH Puntual, a survey that was replaced by the EPH 
Continua at the end of 2003. Unfortunately, the EPH Puntual does not include questions about 
sharing housework. Hence, with the placebo runs, we can only confirm that age differences across 
groups do not drive the results on divorce but we cannot draw any conclusion about the bargaining
28We deliberately avoid including the year 2002 in our placebo sample period because it is the year th a t follows the severe financial crisis tha t hit Argentina in December 2001.
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power outcomes.
6.2 A lternative R obustness Check
In this Section, we re-estimate the effects of the reform on a different sample with a different cohort 
composition from that used in Section 5 for the same period as our main specification i.e. 2004-2009. 
This new sample avoids contamination of the reform effect with other effects coming from aging 
and retirement, such as the stress arising from the more frequent day-to-day contact of the couple. 
Looking back at Table 1, one notices that certain ages, both in the control and treatment groups, 
are only observed in either the pre- or post-reform periods. This means that the cohort and period 
dummies do not control for age adequately and hence, age effects, if any, may blur the interpretation 
of the reform effect. To curb this concern, we introduce new cohorts to the pre-reform period and 
drop post-reform observations of other cohorts so as to achieve a balanced composition of ages before 
and after the reform.
Table 9 illustrates the difference between the benchmark sample (Section 5) and the sample used 
in this exercise. The cohort-year observations used in this exercise are those in the shadow area 
while the cohort-year observations used in Section 5 are those enclosed in a frame, some of which 
are incorporated in this exercise and some are dropped. We aim to keep the maximum possible 
number of cohort-year observations used in the main estimations of Section 5 that allows us to find 
a group of women in the pre-reform period that matches exactly the post-reform age profiles of our 
treated and control groups. To achieve this purpose, some cohort-year observations had to be deleted 
and some were added. More specifically, cohort 1941 and 1953 are excluded from the treated and 
control groups, respectively, while observations from cohorts 1939-1941 and 1947-1949 are added to 
the pre-reform period.
We can estimate the effect of the reform using the following specification:
Vit =  a + fiTreati x Postt +  ATreati x Agingi + óC + ót +  X 'y + egt (2)
where Treati is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for all cohorts born in 1944 or earlier, implicitly 
the control group is composed of cohorts 1947-1950. Postt is defined as a dummy that takes value
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1 for observations from periods 2007-2009. óC and ót are cohort and period (year-quarter) fixed 
effects, respectively, X i is a vector of individual characteristics and eit is the residual. We wish to 
account for an aging effect, a common effect to all those aged more than 60. We would not be able 
to identify this effect with a dummy for over 60, for example, since that dummy would be identical 
to Treatj,. Instead, we drive a wedge between the two definitions by creating an artificial variable 
Agingi that for all women takes value 1 except in the first year their cohort is present in which case 
it takes the value zero. The interaction of Treati x Agingi, would identify the effect of growing older 
for the treated group. For example, for all cohorts 1939-1941 Treatj, x Agingi, is equal to zero in 
2003 but equal to one after that, while for all cohorts 1942-1944 it takes value zero in 2006 and value 
one after that. This wedge is enough to avoid multicollinearity while still being able to identify the 
common effect of aging.
In Table 10 we show the estimated fi coefficients using specification 2. These estimates are 
alternative to the main specification presented in Section 5 but here we try to purge potential 
aging and retirement effects. The estimated effects of the reform on income are slightly stronger as 
expected, and the effects on divorce are strengthened, i.e., the estimated impact on the probability 
of divorce is now 4.8 pp (versus 2.6pp) and this value is still driven only by the effect on the highly 
educated. On Table 11 we show the effects on our measures of bargaining power on the sample of 
women with a low level of education who are living only with their partner. The effects on income 
are stronger but the results on the sharing housework are identical to those presented in Table 6.
6.3 Effects on Labor M arket Participation
Applying the same specification as in 1, we find a statistically significant effect of -6 .4  pp (or 26%) 
of the reform on female labor force participation. Our results on female labor force participation are 
in line with those of Bosch and Guajardo 2012. Male labor force participation also decreases as a 
consequence of the reform (-8.9 pp or 17.2%). Despite these effects, average female income share 
within the couple increases significantly by 15 pp (column 4 of Table 6).
One may worry that the effects on the distribution of household chores could, at least in part, 
be explained by a reduction in labor market participation of husbands/partners and the consequent 
increase in the time available to dedicate to household activities. However, if we look at results in
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Panel B of Table 12 we see that once we control for potential aging and retirement as in Section 6.2. 
the effect of the reform on the labor force participation vanishes.
7 C onclusion
What happens inside the household is often not observable to researchers. However, there seems 
to be a consensus that processes that occur inside the household may have major consequences for 
economic and social outcomes of individuals and society as a whole. The economic literature has 
provided evidence that cash transfer programs can, presumably by altering such processes, have large 
effects on economic outcomes (e.g., labor force participation, child development). In this paper we 
focus on senior women, all over retirement age, and ask whether cash transfers can affect their marital 
status and bargaining power within the household. We find surprising effects in this population; 
both union dissolution and outcomes related to bargaining power are affected by public transfers. 
Our results on the effects of income shocks on divorce/separation call attention to potential sample 
selection that may exist in the intra-household bargaining power literature.
Our empirical application comes from a differences-in-differences estimation of the effects of the 
2004/2005 Argentinean pension reform. We use data from the Argentinean Continuous Permanent 
Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua) for the years 2004-2009. The Ar- 
gentinean pension reform is an interesting application because it affected the permanent income of 
almost 2 million women in Argentina; . The large and permanent income shock had an impact of 
5.6 pp on the probability of divorce/separation amongst the highest educated seniors (high school 
diploma or more). Amongst the lowest educated seniors while we find no effects on the probability 
of divorce/separation, we find a decrease of 7 pp (or 11.7%) in the probability that the wives are the 
only ones in charge of household chores and a statistically significant increase of 6.1 pp (or 16.5%) 
in the probability that husbands help with household chores.
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Tables
Table 1: Definition of treated and control groups
Pre treatment (2004-2006) Post treatment (2007-2009)T reated  cohortsborn 1941-1944 ages 60-65 ages 63-68
C ontrol cohortsborn 1950-1953 ages 51-56 ages 54-59
P re-trea tm en t P ost-trea tm en t
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
C ohort Age
1941 63 64 65 66 67 681942 62 63 64 65 66 67Treated 1943 61 62 63 64 65 661944 60 61 62 63 64 65
1950 54 55 56 57 58 591951 53 54 55 56 57 58C ontrol 1952 52 53 54 55 56 571953 51 52 53 54 55 56
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Table 2: Sample Means: Divorced/separated and married/cohabiting women
C ontrol cohorts T reated cohorts A ll sam ple
2004-06 2007-09 2004-06 2007-09 2004-06 2007-09
P an el A: A ll d iv o rced /sep a ra ted  or m arrie d /c o h a b itin g  w om en
Pension recipient 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.72 0.09 0.31
No personal income 0.41 0.39 0.52 0.16 0.45 0.31
Personal income (Argentine Pesos: AR$) 480.59 958.43 332.85 783.39 424.07 893.45
Personal income (2009 P P P  USD) 321.27 580.07 222.39 474.11 283.44 540.74
Education (high=1, low=0) 0.46 0.47 0.34 0.33 0.41 0.42
Born abroad 0.07 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.08 0.09
Divorced or separated 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.18
Legally married 0.70 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.72 0.72
In union (not legally married) 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.11
M arried or in union, living only w ith spouse 0.13 0.2 0.36 0.43 0.22 0.29
Active (in the labor market) 0.58 0.55 0.34 0.22 0.49 0.43
Observations 11051 10433 6460 6092 17511 16525
P an el B: W om en w ith  a lower level o f ed u cation
Pension recipient 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.74 0.07 0.35
No personal income 0.47 0.45 0.59 0.17 0.52 0.33
Personal income (Argentine Pesos: AR$) 224.21 461.44 165.84 546.38 199.07 497.65
Personal income (2009 P P P  USD) 149.97 279.77 110.83 330.47 133.11 301.39
Born abroad 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.12
Divorced or separated 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.15
Legally married 0.68 0.70 0.76 0.75 0.71 0.72
In union (not legally married) 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13
M arried or in union, living only w ith spouse 0.14 0.21 0.34 0.4 0.23 0.29
Active (in the labor market) 0.52 0.48 0.3 0.18 0.43 0.35
Observations 6189 5609 4382 4071 10571 9680
P an el C: W om en w ith  a higher level o f ed u cation
Pension recipient 0.05 0.07 0.27 0.67 0.12 0.25
No personal income 0.33 0.32 0.39 0.12 0.35 0.26
Personal income (Argentine Pesos: AR$) 785.54 1523.24 662.36 1263.8 746.95 1446.93
Personal income (2009 P P P  USD) 525.01 921.34 442.51 765.28 499.16 875.44
Born abroad 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07
Divorced or separated 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.2 0.21
Legally married 0.71 0.72 0.76 0.70 0.73 0.71
In union (not legally married) 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08
M arried or in union, living only w ith spouse 0.12 0.2 0.4 0.48 0.21 0.28
Active (in the labor market) 0.66 0.63 0.42 0.3 0.58 0.53
Observations 4862 4824 2078 2021 6940 6845
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Table 3: Sample Means: Married/cohabiting women with a lower level of education
C ontrol cohorts T reated cohorts A ll sam ple
2004-06 2007-09 2004-06 2007-09 2004-06 2007-09
P an el A: A ll m arr ied /co h ab itin g  w om en w ith  a lower level o f ed u cation
Pension recipient 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.74 0.06 0.35
No personal income 0.54 0.52 0.65 0.19 0.59 0.37
Personal income (Argentine Pesos: AR$) 190.53 406.01 141.91 510.42 168.95 451.53
Personal income (2009 P P P  USD) 127.33 245.94 94.73 308.98 112.86 273.42
W ife’s share of income within couple 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.33 0.21 0.27
Born abroad 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.11
Legally married 0.83 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.85
In union (not legally married) 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15
M arried or in union, living only with spouse 0.17 0.25 0.4 0.46 0.27 0.34
Couple’s age difference 2.54 2.23 2.37 2.43 2.47 2.32
Couple’s education difference -0.31 -0.33 -0.44 -0.43 -0.36 -0.37
Wife is uniquely responsible for housework 0.4 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.43
Husband does housework 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.35 0.25 0.3
Have domestic service or external help 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Active (in the labor market) 0.46 0.43 0.26 0.15 0.37 0.31
Observations 5160 4613 3808 3527 8968 8140
P an el B: W om en w ith  a lower level o f ed u cation  liv in g  on ly  w ith  h u sb an d /p artn er
Pension recipient 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.8 0.1 0.49
No personal income 0.54 0.49 0.64 0.14 0.6 0.28
Personal income (Argentine Pesos: AR$) 207.72 444.84 147.45 546.80 168.7 505.09
Personal income (2009 P P P  USD) 138.12 269.6 98.33 330.93 112.36 305.84
W ife’s share of income within couple 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.34 0.21 0.31
Born abroad 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12
Legally married 0.73 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.79 0.83
In union (not legally married) 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.17
Couple’s age difference 3.55 2.89 2.81 3.26 3.07 3.11
Couple’s education difference -0.35 -0.34 -0.44 -0.47 -0.41 -0.42
Wife is uniquely responsible for housework 0.6 0.58 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.54
Husband does housework 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.37 0.42
Have domestic service or external help 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Active (in the labor market) 0.49 0.47 0.25 0.15 0.33 0.28
Observations 843 1081 1469 1564 2312 2645
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Table 4: Effects of the reform on income.
P an el A: A ll d iv o rced /sep a ra ted  or m arr ied /co h ab itin g w om en
(1) (2) (3)Receive W ithout Personal incomea pension personal income (U$S P P P )
Post*Treated 0.533 -0.358 61.453SE (0.038)*** (0.031)*** (13.006)***p-value from wild bootstrap  SE [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.02]**
Observations 34,036 34,036 34,036Obs. in treatm ent group 12552 12552 12552Mean dependent variable 0.166 0.523 222.4
P an el B: W om en w ith  a lower level o f ed u cation
(1)Receive (2)W ithout (3)Personal incomea pension personal income (U$S P P P )
Post*Treated 0.610 -0.412 91.533SEp-value from wild bootstrap  SE (0.020)***[0.000]*** (0.028)***[0.002]*** (16.938)***[0.002]***
Observations 20,251 20,251 20,251Obs. in treatm ent group 8453 8453 8453Mean dependent variable 0.112 0.593 110.8
P an el C: W om en w ith  a higher level o f ed u cation
(1)Receive (2)W ithout (3)Personal incomea pension personal income (U$S P P P )
Post*Treated 0.375 -0.254 47.610SEp-value from wild bootstrap  SE (0.031)***[0.000]*** (0.012)***[0.002]*** (21.850)**[0.088]*
Observations 13,785 13,785 13,785Obs. in treatm ent group *4099 4099 4099Mean dependent variable 0.274 0.386 442.5
Note: The dependent variables are: a dummy that equals one when the woman receives a pension (columns 1); a dummy that equals one when she has no personal income (columns 2); and the woman’s monthly personal income in international 2009 PPP dollars (column 3). The coefficient on Post*Treated is the estimated parameter fi of equation 1 which is the DD estimates (OLS) of the effect of the reform on each of the outcomes. Period 2004-2006 is the pre-treatment period and period 2007-2009 is the post-treatment period. The treatment group includes women born between 1941 and 1944, and the control group women born between 1950 and 1953. All regressions include the following control variables: cohort dummies, year-quarter fixed effects, region fixed effects (29 urban areas), a dummy variable that equals one if the maximum level of education attained is at least a high school diploma, and a dummy variable that equals one if the woman was born abroad. Regression in column (3) also includes a dummy that indicates whether the woman belongs to the top 1% of the distribution of personal income, to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers. The sample includes all married/cohabiting and divorced/separated women (i.e. it excludes singles and widows). Data source: Argentine Continuous Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua, EPH). All results come from regressions using as sample weights the variable pondera in the EPH. SE are clustered at the level of urban area (29 areas). Cluster robust sandwich standard errors are in parentheses, and in squared brackets we show two-tail p-values computed using wild bootstrap-t techniques as in Cameron et al. (2008) with a 6-point distribution as in Webb (2013) and 1000 bootstrap iterations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Effects of the reform on the probability of being divorced/separated
Dep. Variable: W om en is d ivorced /separa ted
(1) (2) (3)All divorced and Women with a lower Women with a highermarried women level of education level of education
Post*Treated 0.026 0.011 0.056
SE (0.008)*** (0.012) (0.022)**p-value from wild bootstrap SE [0.088]* [0.616] [0.098]*
Observations 34,036 20,251 13,785Obs. in treatment group 12552 8453 4099Mean dependent variable 0.142 0.132 0.164
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the woman is divorced or separated. The coefficient on Post*Treated is the estimated parameter fi of equation 1 which is the DD estimates (OLS) of the effect of the reform on each of the outcomes. Period 2004-2006 is the pre-treatment period and period 2007-2009 is the post-treatment period. The treatment group includes women born between 1941 and 1944, and the control group women born between 1950 and 1953. All regressions include the following control variables: cohort dummies, year-quarter fixed effects, region fixed effects (29 urban areas), a dummy variable that equals one if the maximum level of education attained is at least a high school diploma, and a dummy variable that equals one if the woman was born abroad. The sample includes all married/cohabiting and divorced/separated women (i.e. it excludes singles and widows). Data source: Argentine Continuous Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua, EPH). All results come from regressions using as sample weights the variable pondera in the EPH. SE are clustered at the level of urban area (29 areas). Cluster robust sandwich standard errors are in parentheses, and in squared brackets we show two-tail p-values computed using wild bootstrap-t techniques as in Cameron et al. (2008) with a 6-point distribution as in Webb (2013) and 1000 bootstrap iterations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Effects of the reform on income and on the bargaining power of married/cohabiting women 
Sample of women with lower level of education living only with husband/partner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)Receive Without Wife’s income Wife’s share Wife is uniquely Husband Domestica pension personal (U S  PPP) of couple’s responsible for does service orincome income housework housework external help
Post*Treated 0.611 -0.457 118.019 0.150 -0.070 0.061 -0.002
SE (0.020)*** (0.024)*** (23.747)*** (0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.015)*** (0.007)p-value from wild bootstrap SE [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.026]** [0.006]*** [0.06]* [0.03]** [0.844]
Observations 4,957 4,957 4,957 4,866 4,957 4,957 4,957Obs. in treatment group 3033 3033 3033 2984 3033 3033 3033Mean dependent variable 0.144 0.638 98.33 0.187 0.597 0.369 0.00823
Note: The dependent variables are: a dummy that equals one when the woman receives a pension (columns 1); a dummy that equals one when she has no personal income (columns 2); the woman’s monthly personal income in international 2009 PPP dollars (column 3), the share of wife’s income within the couple (columns 4), a dummy that equals one if the wife is the only household member responsible for housework (column 5), a dummy variable that equals one if the husband does housework (column 6), and a dummy variable that equals one if the household has domestic service or external help for housework (column 7). The coefficient on Post*Treated is the estimated parameter fi of equation 1 which is the DD estimates (OLS) of the effect of the reform on each of the outcomes. Period 2004-2006 is the pre-treatment period and period 2007-2009 is the post-treatment period. The treatment group includes women born between 1941 and 1944, and the control group women born between 1950 and 1953. All regressions include the following control variables: cohort dummies, year-quarter fixed effects, region fixed effects (29 urban areas), a dummy variable that equals one if the woman was born abroad, an indicator of husband being above retirement age, and differences between spouses’ age and level of education attained. Regression in column (3) also includes a dummy that indicates whether the woman belongs to the top 1% of the distribution of personal income, to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers. The sample includes all low-educated married/cohabiting women living only with their partners. Data source: Argentine Continuous Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua, EPH). All results come from regressions using as sample weights the variable pondera in the EPH. SE are clustered at the level of urban area (29 areas). Cluster robust sandwich standard errors are in parentheses, and in squared brackets we show two-tail p-values computed using wild bootstrap-t techniques as in Cameron et al. (2008) with a 6-point distribution as in Webb (2013) and 1000 bootstrap iterations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7: Placebo DD: Definition of treated and control groups
Placebo pre treatment (1996-1998) Placebo post treatment (1999-2001)Placebo treated cohortsborn 1933-1936 ages 60-65 ages 63-68
Placebo control cohortsborn 1942-1945 ages 51-56 ages 54-59
Placebo p re -trea tm en t P lacebo post-trea tm en t
(to) (to)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
C ohort Age
1933 63 64 65 66 67 681934 62 63 64 65 66 67Ireated 1935 61 62 63 64 65 661936 60 61 62 63 64 65
1942 54 55 56 57 58 591943 53 54 55 56 57 58Control 1944 52 53 54 55 56 571945 51 52 53 54 55 56
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Table 8: Placebo using pre-treatment data (1996-2001)
All divorced divorced/separated or married/cohabiting women
P an el A: A ll d iv o rced /sep a ra ted  or m arr ied /co h ab itin g  w om en
( 1  (2) (3) (4)Probability of Probability of not W omen’s personal Probability of beingreceiving a pension having any personal income income (Dollars P P P ) divorced/separated
Post*Treated 0.0195 0.00351 -7.394 -0.0127SE (0.0115) (0.0207) (11.31) (0.0310)p-value from wild bootstrap  SE [0.312] [0.884] [0.764] [0.77]
Observations 24,345 24,336 24,345 24,336
P an el B: W om en w ith a lower level o f ed u cation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post*Treated 0.0126 0.0135 -7.814 -0.0332SE (0.0140) (0.0228) (11.89) (0.0172)*p-value from wild bootstrap  SE [0.586] [0.6] [0.702] [0.386]
Observations 14,736 14,729 14,729 14,736
P an el C: W om en w ith a higher level o f ed u cation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post*Treated 0.0414 -0.0116 -4.602 0.0129SE (0.0156)** (0.0605) (43.13) (0.0459)p-value from wild bootstrap  SE [0.112] [0.864] [0.924] [0.786]
Observations 9,609 9,607 9,607 9,609
Note: The dependent variables are: a dummy that equals one when the women receives a pension (column 1), a dummy that equals one when she has no personal income (column 2), the woman’s monthly personal income in international 2009 PPP dollars (column 3), and a dummy that equals one when the woman is divorced or separated (column 4). Concretely, coefficient on Post*Treated is the estimated parameter fi of equation (1) for the placebo DD estimates (OLS) specified in Section 4 (see Table 7). Period 1996-1998 is the placebo pre-treatment period and period 1999-2001 post-treatment period. The placebo treatment group includes all women born between 1933 and 1936, and the placebo control group women born between 1942 and 1945. All regressions include the following control variables: cohort dummies, year-quarter fixed effects, regions fixed effects, a dummy variable that equals one if the maximum level of education attained is at least a high school diploma, and a dummy variable that equals one if the woman was born abroad. The sample includes all married/cohabiting and divorced/separated women (i.e. it excludes singles and widows). Data source: Argentine Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Puntual, EPH). All results come from regressions using as sample weights the variable pondera in the EPH. SE are clustered at the level of urban area (29 areas). Cluster robust sandwich standard errors are in parentheses, and in squared brackets we show two-tail p-values computed using wild bootstrap-t techniques as in Cameron et al. (2008) with a 6-point distribution as in Webb (2013) and 1000 bootstrap iterations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 9: Age of cohorts by years used in exercise of Section 6.2.
B ir t i l  c o h o rt 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1939* 64 65 66 67
1940* 63 64 65 66
1941 62 63 64 65 66 67 y
1942 62 63 64 65 66 67
1943 61 62 63 64 65 66
1944 60 61 62 63 64 65
1947* 56 57 58 59
1948* 55 56 57 58
1949* 54 55 56 57
1950 54 55 56 57 58 59
1951 53 54 55 56 57 58
1952 52 53 54 55 56 57
1953 51
V_____
52 53 54 55 56
____ y
Note: Cells contain the age of each cohort by year. Stars indicate the new cohorts added in the analysis of Section 6.2. All cohort-year observations included in this analysis are in the shadow areas. Cohort-year observations included in the main analysis of Section 4 are enclosed in boxes (observations that cannot be included in the analysis in of Section 6.2. are in gray print).
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Table 10: Effects of the reform on income and divorce/separation from alternative specification usedin Section 6.2.
Sample of divorced/separated or married/cohabiting women
P an el A: A ll d iv o rced /sep a ra ted  or m a rr ied /co h a b itin g  w om en
(1) (2) (3) (4)Receive Without Women’s income Divorced ora pension personal income (U S PPP) Separated
Post*Treated 0.461 -0.335 114.089 0.048SE (0.081)*** (0.039)*** (14.796)*** (0.021)**p-value wild bootstrap [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.084]*
Observations 30,545 30,545 30,545 30,545Obs. in treatment group 11881 11881 11881 11881Mean dependent variable 0.209 0.509 239.3 0.138
P an el B: W om en  w ith  a low er level o f  ed u cation
(1) (2) (3) (4)Receive Without Women’s income Divorced ora pension personal income (U S PPP) Separated
Post*Treated 0.548 -0.392 121.915 -0.005SE (0.066)*** (0.027)*** (28.248)*** (0.023)p-value wild bootstrap [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.85]
Observations 18,819 18,819 18,819 18,819Obs. in treatment group 8145 8145 8145 8145Mean dependent variable 0.143 0.586 111.6 0.115
P an el C: W om en  w ithl a  h igher lev el o f  ed u cation
(1) (2) (3) (4)Receive Without Women’s income Divorced ora pension personal income (U S PPP) Separated
Post*Treated 0.269 -0.224 145.652 0.141SE (0.075)*** (0.061)*** (28.640)*** (0.055)**p-value wild bootstrap [0.004]*** [0.032]** [0.006]*** [0.072]*
Observations 11,726 11,726 11,726 11,726Obs. in treatment group 3736 3736 3736 3736Mean dependent variable 0.347 0.350 503.6 0.183
Note: The dependent variables are: a dummy that equals one when the woman receives a pension (columns 1); a dummy that equals one when she has no personal income (columns 2); the woman’s monthly personal income in international 2009 PPP dollars (column 3), and a dummy that equals one if the woman is divorced or separated (column 4). The coefficient on Post*Treated is the estimated parameter of equation 2. Period 2004-2006 is the pre-treatment period and period 2007-2009 is the post-treatment period. The treatment group includes women born between 1939 and 1944, and the control group women born between 1947 and 1952. Table 9 describes the cohort-period composition of the sample. All regressions include the following control variables: cohort dummies, year-quarter fixed effects, region fixed effects (29 urban areas), a dummy variable that equals one if the maximum level of education attained is at least a high school diploma, and a dummy variable that equals one if the woman was born abroad and the interaction term Post*old. Regression in column (3) also includes a dummy that indicates whether the woman belongs to the top 1% of the distribution of personal income, to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers. The sample includes all married/cohabiting and divorced/separated women (i.e. it excludes singles and widows). Data source: Argentine Continuous Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua, EPH). All results come from regressions using as sample weights the variable pondera in the EPH. SE are clustered at the level of urban area (29 areas). Cluster robust sandwich standard errors are in parentheses, and in squared brackets we show two-tail p-values computed using wild bootstrap-t techniques as in Cameron et al. (2008) with a 6-point distribution as in Webb (2013) and 1000d)ootstrap iterations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11: Effects of the reform on income and on the bargaining power of married/cohabiting women from alternative specificationused in Section 6.2.
Sample women with lower level of education living only with husband/partner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)Receive Without Wife’s income Wife’s share Wife is uniquely Husband Domestica pension personal (U S  PPP) of couple’s responsible for does service orincome income housework housework external help
Post*Treated 0.613 -0.672 188.669 0.271 -0.070 0.072 0.010
SE (0.089)*** (0.064)*** (43.507)*** (0.076)*** (0.031)** (0.038)* (0.012)
p-value w ild b o o ts tra p [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.014]** [0.016]** [0.038]** [0.036]** [0.508]
Observations 5,129 5,129 5,129 5,028 5,129 5,129 5,129Obs. in treatment group 3070 3070 3070 3016 3070 3070 3070Mean dependent variable 0.186 0.610 103.2 0.189 0.555 0.396 0.0145
Note: The dependent variables are: a dummy that equals one when the woman receives a pension (columns 1); a dummy that equals one when she has no personal income (columns 2); the woman’s monthly personal income in international 2009 PPP dollars (column 3), the share of wife’s income within the couple (columns 4), a dummy that equals one if the wife is the only household member responsible for housework (column 5), a dummy variable that equals one if the husband does housework (column 6), and a dummy variable that equals one if the household has domestic service or external help for housework (column 7). The coefficient on Post*Treated is the estimated parameter fi of equation 2. Period 2004-2006 is the pre-treatment period and period 2007-2009 is the post-treatment period. The treatment group includes women born between 1939 and 1944, and the control group women born between 1947 and 1952. Table 9 describes the cohort-period composition of the sample. All regressions include the following control variables: cohort dummies, year-quarter fixed effects, region fixed effects (29 urban areas), a dummy variable that equals one if the woman was born abroad, an indicator of husband being above retirement age, and differences between spouses’ age and level of education attained. Regression in column (3) also includes a dummy that indicates whether the woman belongs to the top 1% of the distribution of personal income, to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers. The sample includes all low-educated married/cohabiting women living only with their partners. Data source: Argentine Continuous Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua, EPH). All results come from regressions using as sample weights the variable pondera in the EPH. SE are clustered at the level of urban area (29 areas). Cluster robust sandwich standard errors are in parentheses, and in squared brackets we show two-tail p-values computed using wild bootstrap-t techniques as in Cameron et al. (2008) with a 6-point distribution as in Webb (2013) and 1000 bootstrap iterations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 12: The effect of the reform on the labor status Sample of women with lower level of education living only with husband/partner
Panel A: Main specification (equation 1)
(1) (2)Wife is in the Husband is in thelabor market labor market
Post*Treated -0.064 -0.089
SE (0.028)** (0.017)***p-value wild bootstrap [0.014]** [0.014]**
Observations 4,956 4,956Obs. in treatment group 3033 3033Mean dependent variable 0.248 0.516
Panel B: Alternative specification of Section 6.2. (equation 2)
(1) (2)Wife is in the Husband is in thelabor market labor market
Post*Treated 0.024 -0.099
SE (0.098) (0.088)p-value wild bootstrap [0.866] [0.668]
Observations 5,126 5,125Obs. in treatment group 3069 3069Mean dependent variable 0.246 0.474
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the wife is economically “active” (column 1) and a dummy that equals one if the husband is economically “active”. In the first panel, the coefficient on Post*Treated is the estimated parameter fi of equation 1which is the DD estimates (OLS) of the effect of the reform on each of the outcomes. Period 2004-2006 is the pre-treatment period and period 2007-2009 is the post-treatment period. The treatment group includes women born between 1941 and 1944, and the control group women born between 1950 and 1953. In the second panel, the coefficient on Post*Treated is the estimated parameter fi of equation 2. Period 2004-2006 is the pre-treatment period and period 2007-2009 is the post- treatment period. The treatment group includes women born between 1939 and 1944, and the control group women born between 1947 and 1952. Table 9 describes the cohort-period composition of the sample. All regressions include the following control variables: cohort dummies, year-quarter fixed effects, region fixed effects (29 urban areas), a dummy variable that equals one if the woman was born abroad, an indicator of husband being above retirement age, and differences between spouses’ age and level of education attained. Regression in column (3) also includes a dummy that indicates whether the woman belongs to the top 1% of the distribution of personal income, to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers. The sample includes all low-educated married/cohabiting women living only with their partners. Data source: Argentine Continuous Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua, EPH). All results come from regressions using as sample weights the variable pondera in the EPH.SE are clustered at the level of urban area (29 areas). Cluster robust sandwich standard errors are in parentheses, and in squared brackets we show two-tail p-values computed using wild bootstrap-t techniques as in Cameron et al. (2008) with a 6-point distribution as in Webb (2013) and 1000 bootstrap iterations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figures
Figure 1: Percentage of individuals with personal income = 0
Source: Argentine Continuous Permanent Household Survey (EPH)
Women ivl en
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Figure 2: Pension recipients (as % of age-eligible individuals)
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Divorced/separated or married/cohabiting women
Figure 3:Pension recipients Figure 4:Women without personal income
Figure 5:Evolution of monthly personal income Figure 6:Woman is divorced/separated
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Women with a lower level of education living only with husband/partner
Figure 7: Wife’s share of income within the couple
Figure 8: Woman is uniquely responsible for housework
Figure 9: Husband does housework
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Figure A.1: News related to the moratorium
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Table A.1: Effects of the reform on income and on the bargaining power of married/cohabiting women 
Sample of married/cohabiting women with a lower level of education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)Receive Without Wife’s income Wife’s share Wife is uniquely Husband Domestica pension personal (U S  PPP) of couple’s responsible for does service orincome income housework housework external help
Post*Treated 0.609 -0.443 98.950 0.149 -0.057 0.025 0.008
SE (0.023)*** (0.027)*** (17.888)*** (0.022)*** (0.015)*** (0.009)*** (0.004)**p-value from wild bootstrap SE [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.056]* [0.072]* [0 .1]
Observations 16,480 16,480 16,480 16,015 16,480 16,476 16,480Obs. in treatment group 7335 7335 7335 6868 7335 7144 7335Mean dependent variable 0.107 0.646 94.73 0.187 0.460 0.285 0.00690
Note: The dependent variables are: a dummy that equals one when the woman receives a pension (columns 1); a dummy that equals one when she has no personal income (columns 2); the woman’s monthly personal income in international 2009 PPP dollars (column 3), the share of wife’s income within the couple (columns 4), a dummy that equals one if the wife is the only household member responsible for housework (column 5), a dummy variable that equals one if the husband does housework (column 6), and a dummy variable that equals one if the household has domestic service or external help for housework (column 7). The coefficient on Post*Treated is the estimated parameter fi of equation 1 which is the DD estimates (OLS) of the effect of the reform on each of the outcomes. Period 2004-2006 is the pre-treatment period and period 2007-2009 is the post-treatment period. The treatment group includes women born between 1941 and 1944, and the control group women born between 1950 and 1953. All regressions include the following control variables: cohort dummies, year-quarter fixed effects, region fixed effects (29 urban areas), a dummy variable that equals one if the woman was born abroad, an indicator of husband being above retirement age, and differences between spouses’ age and level of education attained. Regression in column (3) also includes a dummy that indicates whether the woman belongs to the top 1% of the distribution of personal income, to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers. The sample includes all low-educated married/cohabiting women. Data source: Argentine Continuous Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua, EPH). All results come from regressions using as sample weights the variable pondera in the EPH. SE are clustered at the level of urban area (29 areas). Cluster robust sandwich standard errors are in parentheses, and in squared brackets we show two-tail p-values computed using wild bootstrap-t techniques as in Cameron et al. (2008) with a 6-point distribution as in Webb (2013) and 1000 bootstrap iterations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
